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Recent Decisions
INFANTS-CHILD NEGLECT PROCEEDING-The Court of Appeals of New
York has held that an indigent parent faced with loss of a child's society,
as well as the possibility of criminal charges, is entitled to assistance of
counsel in child neglect proceedings and is required to be advised of
such right.
In re Ella R.B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 133
(1972).
Jeri B., indigent mother of a three-year-old baby girl, had her child
taken away from her by the State of New York after a court decree
found the child to be neglected.' The court based its decision upon
the fact that the mother had left the child alone on the morning of
June 21, 1969, and the child was allegedly kidnapped and raped by a
friend of the mother.2 The court did not inform the mother that if
she could not afford to be represented by an attorney at the custody
hearing a court appointed attorney would be provided.3 The statute
applicable to custody proceedings of this nature did not provide for
assigned counsel for indigent parents. 4 The supreme court, appellate
division, affirmed, and leave to appeal was granted.5 The court of ap-
peals reversed the decision of the two lower courts.6
The gravamen of the New York court's ruling that an indigent par-
ent is entitled to assistance of counsel in the civil proceeding concern-
ing the possible loss of a child's society, as well as a criminal neglect
proceeding, appears to be rooted in a substantive due process theory.
This is exemplified by the court's reference to the parent-child relation-
ship as being too fundamental an interest and right to be relinquished
to the state without the opportunity for a hearing with assigned coun-
sel if the parent lacks the means to retain a lawyer.7 Failure by a tri-
bunal to do so, the court expressed, would constitute a violation of due
process.8
In approaching the problem from a substantive due process theory,
the New York court recognized two fundamental rights-the right to
1. In re Ella R. B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972).
2. Id. at 352, 285 N.E.2d at 289, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
3. Id.
4. Law of Sept. 1, 1962, ch. 686, § 343 (repealed 1970), as amended, N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT
§ 962 (McKinney 1970).
5. 30 N.Y. 2d at 352, 285 N.E.2d at 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
6. Id. at 352, 285 N.E.2d at 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 133-34.
7. Id. at 353, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
8. Id.
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maintain the family unit, and the right to counsel. As to the fundamen-
tal right of the family unit, the New York court relied on a coterie of
cases, covering many years, that considered the family unit or parent-
child relationship to be a fundamental interest protected from un-
constitutional state intrusion by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The New York court took note of the United
States Supreme Court decision, Stanley v. Illinois.9 In Stanley, pursuant
to an Illinois state statute, an unwed father's children were declared
wards of the state upon the death of the mother without any hearing
as to his fitness as a parent. 10 In holding the statute unconstitutional,
the Court emphasized the importance of the family unit and the right
to conceive and raise one's children as an essential, basic civil right of
man."
Even more germane to the disposition of the instant case was the
long line of cases recognizing the fundamental right existing in the
family or parent-child relationship that culminated in the Stanley deci-
sion. The New York court appears to have relied heavily on these cases
for the due process approach that they adopted.' 2
The first case of significance in this precedential chain is Meyer v.
Nebraska.5 In Meyer, a teacher was convicted for teaching a pupil the
German language in violation of a Nebraska statute that made teaching
of any language other than English prior to the completion of eighth
grade a misdemeanor.1 4 In determining that the statute as so con-
strued and applied unreasonably infringed upon the liberty guaran-
teed parents in raising their children, the Court held that liberty as
protected under the fourteenth amendment not only protects freedom
from bodily restraint, but the right to marry, to establish a home, and
to bring up children.'
The existence of the fundamental right to a family relationship was
extended in the Supreme Court decision, Pierce v. Society of Sisters of
9. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
10. Id.
11. The Court in Stanley also stated:
It is cardinal with us that custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder. . . . The integrity of the family unit has
found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . ..
Id. at 651.
12. 30 N.Y.2d at 353, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
13. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14. Id. at 397.
15. Id. at 399.
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the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary.16 The Court, in Pierce, struck down
an Oregon statute that compelled all children between the ages of
eight and sixteen to attend public schools.' 7 The reason for holding the
statute unconstitutional -was that it violated the fourteenth amendment
by usurping the fundamental right and duty in the parent to direct a
child's destiny and prepare him for future obligations.'i The substan-
tive due process line of cases in this legal milieu was augmented by a
series of decisions in the 1940's and 1950's.19
The theory that familial relationships are so fundamental that they
fall under the penumbra of substantive due process rights guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment reached its apex of current acceptance in
Griswold v. Connecticut.20 The theory behind Griswold became the
core of the Stanley case used by the New York court. The plaintiffs in
Griswold were the executive director of the Planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut and a licensed physician for the league who
were convicted of violating a Connecticut statute that proscribed the
dissemination of contraceptive information and materials. 2' The plain-
tiffs appealed their conviction on the grounds that the Connecticut
law forbidding the use of contraceptives intrudes upon the right of
marital privacy.22 In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court
declared that the case concerned a relationship lying within the zone
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees,
and that this relationship could not be regulated by an overly broad
statute that invaded these protected freedoms. 23
It was after the determination by the court that the issue in the case
at bar involved a threat to such a fundamental interest, that the court
focused on the issue of how to protect this fundamental right involved
16. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
17. Id. at.530.
18. Id. at 535.
19. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942). In striking down a statute that
allowed for sterilization of individuals convicted of felonies two or more times as un-
constitutionally vague, the Court stated: "[w]e are dealing here with legislation that
involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race . I..." d. at 541. See al5o May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Prince v. Massachusetts, 312 U.S. 158 (1944).
20. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 480.
22. Id. at 479.
23. Id. at 485. Justice Goldberg stated,
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
Id. at 486.
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in a civil proceeding.24 The prophylactic against government intrusion
was the finding that a constitutional right exists to have appointed
counsel in a civil proceeding that could result in the loss of a child's
society. 25
The court cited Cleaver v. Wilcox 26 and Boddie v. Connecticut 7 for
the proposition that it did not matter whether the proceeding is labeled
civil or criminal, it is a denial of due process to remove the child of
an indigent parent without the right of counsel because of the funda-
mental interest that exists between child and parent.28 The Boddie
case dealt with a class action brought on behalf of women in Connecti-
cut receiving state welfare assistance and desiring to obtain divorces,
but who were barred by their inability to pay the required court costs. 2
The statute was held to be unconstitutional for it precluded access to
the courts for the purpose of dissolving the marital relationship. 0 In
both cases the respective proceedings were civil.
History is not as replete with cases requiring the right to counsel in
civil proceedings as it is with cases respecting the fundamental rights
involved in the family unit. The few American cases dealing with the
right to counsel have revolved around the constitutional interpretation
of the sixth amendment's right to counsel in criminal prosecutions.
The importance of counsel in civil litigation was recognized early in,
English legal history.81 Recorded pleadings from the late thirteenth
and early fourteenth centuries, in which suitors informed the court
that they were too poor to afford lawyers and prayed assistance, fairly
demonstrate that counsel were assigned to plead the causes of people
too poor to pay any fees. 2 This procedure was codified in England by
a statute of Henry VII which provided for assigned attorneys to pre-
pare and handle cases for indigent parties.83.
The lethargic evolution of the right to counsel in civil cases in the
United States is readily explicable when one contrasts the English and
24. 30 N.Y.2d at 353, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
25. Id.
26. 40 U.S.L.W. 2658 (D.N. Cal. Mar. 22, 1972). The Wilcox case involved a class action
brought by the mother of a minor child who was found to be a dependent child of the
court, in a civil proceeding without the benefit of counsel for the mother.
27. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
28. 30 N.Y.2d at 353, 285 N.E.2d at 290, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
29. 401 U.S. at 372.
30. Id. at 383.
31. Hisey, Right to Counsel in Civil Matters, 31 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFcAsE 302 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Hisey].
32. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966).
33. Hisey, supra note 31, at 303.
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American legal systems. The need for attorneys in England developed
from the myriad of rigid and technical rules indigenous to English
society.8 4 The American legal system was characterized by a departure
from the settled principles of common law, and a. concentration on the
equitable considerations involved.3 5 Thus, the simplicity of the Ameri-
can legal system in the early seventeenth century obviated a need for
a trained bar, and failed to provide the initial framework for a right to
counsel in civil litigation. 36 Therefore, the grounds for such a right
must be gleaned from the blend of the development and ramifications
of the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions and the inherent rights
embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 37
The Supreme Court, in Powell v. Alabama,8s held that the aid of
counsel was encompassed within those fundamental principles of lib-
erty and justice. which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions. 39 The case concerned an illiterate, indigent Black who
was not afforded the right to counsel in a capital case.40 The-importance
of a right to counsel in a civil,, as well as criminal proceeding, has
greater significance when.it is kept in mind that Powell, the first right
to counsel case ajudicated, suggested that the right to counsel may
exist in civil cases, too.
It cannot be denied that the requisites of procedural due process-
notice and a. fair hearing-are just as essential to civil proceedings as
they are to criminal. 41 In Hovey v. Elliot,42 the Court held that a civil
litigant may not be deprived of an opportunity to be heard. 48 The
importance of the right to be heard as a substantive right under the
triumverate penumbra of life, liberty, and property was reinforced by
a line of recent judicial decisions. 44
The logical nexus between the right to be heard and the litigation
process is the right to counsel. As the Court noted in the criminal case,
34. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L REV. 1322, 1328
(1966).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Hisey, supra note 31, at 303.
38. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 55 (1932).
39. Id. at 67. The Court continued: "[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law." Id. at 69.
40. 287 U.S. at 50.
41. Hisey, supra note 31, at 304.
42. 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
43. Id. at 414.
44. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965); In re Walsh, 64 Misc. 2d 293, 315 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Family Ct. 1970).
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Powell v. Alabama, the right to be heard would in many cases be of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. 45
A further examination of the right to counsel in criminal cases
indicates that courts have strenuously recognized the need for counsel
not only to enable the litigant to be effectively heard, but also because
of the morass of intricate and complex legal technicalities that any
litigant is faced with.46 In Powell, the Court noted that the plight of
the untrained layman, to whom the court system would seem complex,
would be unbearable without the aid of counsel.47 The inability of the
unskilled litigant to prepare his pleadings, to conduct an adequate
investigation and discovery, and to blend the use of precedent and
logic into a coherent attack is no less intricate in most civil litigation.48
The Supreme Court, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Vir-
ginia,49 declared that a layman cannot be expected to know how to
protect his rights when dealing with practiced and carefully counseled
adversaries. 50 The Trainmen case dealt with a group of railroad work-
ers who would advise injured workers to obtain legal advice from cer-
tain recommended attorneys, and the Virginia State Bar's attempt to
enjoin such practice urging that it constituted the solicitation of legal
business, an unethical course of conduct.51 While the civil litigant is
not faced with the same omnipotence of his opponent as a defendant
in a criminal prosecution,52 the injuries resulting from such a proceed-
ing can be just as devastating. 53
Finally, an analysis of history shows that the right to appointed
counsel is necessitated by the possible gravity of consequences 54 -re-
striction of freedom in criminal prosecutions, and loss of life, liberty,
and property without due process of law in civil litigation.55 The sever-
ity of the penalty or final judicial outcome bears a strong relationship
to the scope of due process protections. The potential disadvantages
accruing to the litigant in a civil proceeding demand great considera-
45. 287 U.S. at 69.
46. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1331 (1966).
47. 287 U.S. at 69.
48. Hisey, supra note 31, at 304.
49. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court noted that the adversarial
system is such that governments, both state and federal, properly spend vast sums of
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Id. at 344.
53. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. Rax. 1322, 1332 (1966).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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tion.58 The resolution of civil cases concerning domestic problems, 57
divorce suits,58 and commitment to mental institutions5 9 can result in
a severe invasion of the substantive rights encompassed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The New York court, in blending the relevant precedent concerning
the substantive and fundamental rights revolving around the familial
unit with the right to counsel, reached a just result in the instant case
and has perhaps made a significant step in the direction of guaranteeing
counsel to individuals in civil proceedings no matter what right is
involved. Common sense dictates the holding in this case for no one
would argue that the relationship between parent and child is so trivial
as to permit a state to terminate a child's society in a one-sided proceed-
ing. But, what fundamental rights the courts will look to when an
indigent defendant in a torts action demands that an attorney should
be provided for him pursuant to the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, or in an action to defend a suit brought by a
creditor as a result of the complicated standard form contract that the
indigent ignorantly entered into is not clear. It is hoped that the step
taken by the New York court will promote the type of concern neces-
sary to establish a constitutional right to appointed counsel in any type
of civil proceeding in which such substantive rights as property inter-
ests, be it contract or tort, familial interests, such as neglect and divorce
proceedings, or rights of similar grave importance are involved.
Samuel Braver
56. Id.
57. In re Walsh, 64 Misc. 2d 293, 315 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Family Ct. 1970).
58. 401 U.S. at 371.
59. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1332
(1966). See also Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
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